This paper demonstrates that the systematic liquidity-risk exposures of mutual funds can predict their performance in the cross-section. The results show that funds that signi…cantly load on liquidity risk subsequently outperform low-loading funds by about 6% annually over the period . The liquidity-risk premium however explains only a small fraction of this outperformance, suggesting that the liquidity-risk exposure of a fund is correlated with its manager's ability to generate abnormal performance. Finally, the liquidity-risk exposure e¤ect in mutual funds can also account for a large part of several other stylized facts such as return persistence, fund size, and smart money.
Introduction
The recent …nancial crisis highlights the necessity of understanding the liquidity risk of …nancial securities and institutions. Early works, such as Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) , Acharya and Pedersen (2005) , and Sadka (2006) , demonstrate the pricing of aggregate liquidity risk (beta) in the cross-section of stocks. Following recent events, there is a growing interest in the e¤ect of liquidity risk in the cross-section of other asset classes.
This paper studies the ability of mutual fund liquidity-risk exposures to predict the cross-section of their performance. 1 Most early studies …nd that the after-fee alphas of mutual funds are either zero or negative (see, e.g., Jensen (1968) , Elton, Gruber, Das, and Hlavka (1993) , Goetzmann (1995), and Gruber (1996) ). Yet, some recent studies argue that it is possible to identify funds with the skill to generate future risk-adjusted performance based on certain fund characteristics. Examples of such characteristics are the styles that funds follow (Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) ), the location of the stocks that funds hold (Coval and Moskowitz (2001) ), the extent to which manager's decisions resemble the decisions of other managers with distinguished performance records (Cohen, Coval, and Pástor (2005) ), the industry concentration of fund holdings (Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005) ), the motivation for trading (Alexander, Cici, and Gibson (2007) ), and fund dependence on analyst recommendations (Kacperczyk and Seru (2007) ). This paper contributes to the literature by showing that the liquidity-risk exposure of a fund can predict its relative future performance, and by providing evidence that this …nding is likely because a fund's liquidity-risk exposure is indicative of its manager's skill to generate abnormal performance.
We calculate the liquidity-risk exposure of a mutual fund as the covariation of its return with unexpected changes in aggregate liquidity (liquidity beta) using a 12-or 24-month historical rolling window. Our …rst result shows that funds that signi…cantly load 1 In terms of economic magnitude, mutual funds are arguably the most important asset class for retail investors. As of 2008 year-end, the value of the assets under management by mutual funds globally is about $19 trillion compared to less than $1.8 trillion of global assets managed by hedge funds, while the asset value of U.S. mutual funds is higher than the total U.S. stock-market value. 1 on liquidity risk subsequently outperform low-loading funds by about 6% annually, on average, over the period 1984 2009. The outperformance of high-liquidity-beta funds is robust to controlling for the Fama and French (1996) size and book-to-market risk factors as well as momentum (e.g., Carhart (1997) ) and …xed-income-related factors. In contrast to liquidity risk, the exposures to other commonly used factors do not predict such a return spread in the cross-section of fund returns. Therefore, the results suggest that fund liquidity-risk exposure is a particularly important determinant of the cross-section of mutual-fund future performance. Additionally, as we study a large universe of mutual funds across multiple asset classes, we classify mutual funds into four groups according to their investment style: Growth, Growth and Income, Income and Bonds, and Others.
The return spread of high-minus-low liquidity beta mutual funds is present within each group, suggesting that the return spread is not due to di¤erences in investment styles.
The outperformance of high-liquidity-beta funds relative to low-liquidity-beta funds may re ‡ect either a liquidity-risk premium stemming from a large cross-sectional variation in fund liquidity beta or a relation between a fund's liquidity beta and the its manager's ability/skill to generate abnormal performance. We begin by studying whether the mutual-fund liquidity-beta return spread can be explained by compensation for a liquidity-risk premium. Note that the existence of a liquidity-risk premium in the crosssection of tradable assets does not necessarily imply a similar premium in the crosssection of portfolios (e.g., funds) of such assets. For example, if all funds similarly load on liquidity risk to earn the liquidity-risk premium, then the exposure to liquidity risk will not generate a signi…cant cross-sectional variation in mutual-fund returns. 2 When we try to explain the high-minus-low liquidity-beta fund portfolio return spread using a …ve-factor model (Fama-French four factors plus a traded liquidity factor), at most 20% of the outperformance of high-liquidity-beta funds relative to low-liquidity-beta funds can be explained by exposures to systematic risk factors.
We further investigate the liquidity beta of fund equity holdings. One explanation for the existence of a liquidity-beta return spread in the cross-section of mutual funds might be that high-and low-liquidity-beta funds hold high-and low-liquidity-beta stocks, respectively, which would imply that the return spread observed in mutual funds is a manifestation of the liquidity-beta spread in stocks, that is the liquidity-risk premium.
Yet, we …nd that high-liquidity-beta funds hold, on average, stocks residing in Decile 6 of liquidity beta in the universe of equities, while the low-liquidity-beta funds hold, on average, stocks in Decile 4 of equity liquidity beta. As the return spread between stocks in Deciles 6 and 4 is quite small, the liquidity-risk premium can at most explain a small fraction of the liquidity-beta return spread in the universe of funds. This result is consistent with the aforementioned …nding that the traded liquidity factor can account for only a small part of the observed liquidity-beta return spread in the cross-section of funds. Both …ndings suggest that mutual funds do not exhibit a wide dispersion in their exposure to liquidity risk. Can the abnormal performance of high-liquidity-beta funds be explained by managers'skillful timing of the exposure to liquidity risk? We apply some timing tests (see, e.g., Henriksson and Merton (1981) and Jagannathan and Korajczyk (1986) ), the results of which show no evidence of a superior skill in short-term (monthly) timing of the exposure to liquidity risk.
Overall, the evidence suggest that the relative outperformance of high-liquidity-beta funds is likely due neither to a liquidity-risk premium nor to mangers' skill to time their exposure to liquidity risk on a monthly basis. Rather, the results suggest that a fund's exposure to liquidity risk is positively correlated with its manager's ability to successfully select undervalued securities whose price is corrected by the market in the long-run. Anecdotally, the investment of Berkshire Hathaway (essentially a closed-end fund managed by Warren Bu¤ett) in Goldman Sachs in the midst of the liquidity crisis in
September 2008 provides an example of such a security-selection ability. 3 At that time, the investment bank exhibited a mildly higher liquidity risk than the average …rm (its liquidity beta ranked around Decile 6 in the stock universe in 2008 and 2009) . The value of investment in Goldman Sachs however continued to deteriorate with market liquidity conditions and improved only a number of months later. After more than two years of investment, the deal ultimately ends with a signi…cant 14% annual return to investment (which is signi…cantly higher than the risk premium of stocks in Decile 6 of liquidity beta). This example illustrates a manager's skill to generate abnormal returns beyond the normal liquidity-risk premium that average stocks with similar liquidity risk can deliver, while lacking the ability to perfectly time liquidity risk. Our results echo Bu¤ett's own views about investment skill, advocating long-term investing while dismissing the possibility of successfully timing short-term market movements. 4 We further …nd that the abnormal outperformance of high-liquidity-beta funds relative to low-liquidity-beta funds is concentrated in periods of relatively moderate liquidity shocks, not in periods of signi…cant positive or negative liquidity shocks, suggesting that the outperformance is not explained by liquidity risk alone. In addition, the high-minuslow liquidity-beta return spread does not exist in the universe of index funds, of which managers are not expected to apply unique skills, and both high-and low-liquidity-risk funds tend to be smaller, they charge higher fees, and trade more frequently than other funds. These results reject the explanation that high-liquidity-beta funds outperform low-liquidity-beta funds because the former are more active and therefore take more risk (and yield high returns), while the latter are more passive and therefore take less risk (and obtain low returns). Instead, the results support an explanation by which a fund's exposure to liquidity risk may signify the fund manager's skill/ability to generate abnormal performance.
Having established the possibility that funds'liquidity-risk exposure is a characteristic related to managerial ability/skill, we examine the relation between the liquidity-riskexposure e¤ect and several other fund-characteristic-based performance e¤ects. First is Press. 4 See, e.g., "Buy American. I Am." By Warren Bu¤ett, The New York Times, October 16, 2008.
4 performance persistence. As investors tend to chase performance (see, e.g., Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Sirri and Tufano (1998) ), it is useful to understand the sources of performance persistence. 5 In the context of liquidity risk, if a fund's liquidity-risk exposure is correlated with the investment skill of its manager then fund performance should be reasonably persistent. We demonstrate that the liquidity-risk exposure can account for the return-persistence phenomenon as documented in Carhart (1997) . Carhart shows that funds with high-prior-year returns continue to outperform funds with low-prior-year
returns, yet this outperformance is not predicted by funds'prior-year momentum beta.
Using regressions, we decompose a fund's prior 12-month average return into an intercept term, a market-beta component, and a liquidity-beta component. We replicate the main persistence e¤ect, that is sorting funds based on past 12-month return generates a signi…cant spread in future fund returns. Yet, we …nd that of the three components of prior return, only liquidity beta generates a similar spread in future fund returns. Therefore, funds with high returns in year t tend to outperform during year t + 1 if year-t returns are mainly driven by high exposures to liquidity risk. These results provide means by which investors can detect persistent managerial skill.
Second is the fund-size e¤ect documented by Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik (2004) .
They …nd that small funds are better able to generate abnormal performance than large funds. In contrast, we focus on liquidity beta, and …nd that the liquidity-beta return spread is apparent in every fund-size quintile, which con…rms that fund size does not explain the liquidity-beta e¤ect. We also …nd that taken alone, fund size is helpful in identifying the funds that underperform (the largest funds) but not funds that earn a positive alpha. To predict outperforming funds, it is important to consider fund size in conjunction with liquidity-risk exposure, that is, small funds with high liquidity-risk exposure tend to outperform. Our results indicate that large funds with high exposures to liquidity risk experience more losses during severe market liquidity conditions than 5 A number of studies …nd persistence in the relative performance of funds (see, e.g., Grinblatt and Titman (1992) , Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1993) , Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1994) , Brown and Goetzmann (1995) , Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995), and Gruber (1996) ). Most of these articles attribute persistence, at least in part, to funds'managerial skill. 5 small funds with similar liquidity-risk exposures; their performance nevertheless does not recover as much as small funds when market liquidity conditions improve. This suggests that large funds may not be su¢ ciently ‡exible to respond to signi…cant variations in market-wide liquidity conditions, which limits their ability to generate outperformance.
While Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik (2004) argue that the fund-size e¤ect is likely caused by the large funds'price-impact costs stemming from the idiosyncratic illiquidity of their underlying positions, our results suggest that the lack of ability of large funds to weather signi…cant shifts in systematic liquidity is yet another source of the diseconomies of scale.
The last e¤ect that we study is the smart-money e¤ect, that is, funds that experience investor in ‡ow subsequently outperform funds that experience investor out ‡ow (see, e.g., Gruber (1996) and Zheng (1999)). We …nd that the liquidity-beta spread is present in both in ‡ow and out ‡ow funds. Consistent with prior studies, our results too indicate that investor ‡ow does not predict fund performance once the momentum factor is included in the performance evaluation (see, e.g., Sapp and Tiwari (2004) ). Yet, once the information about funds' liquidity-risk exposure is utilized, the smart-money e¤ect is apparent in funds with high-liquidity-risk exposures. Especially, in ‡ows can predict outperforming funds (those whose alpha is signi…cantly positive) when conditioning on high-liquidityrisk exposure, even after controlling for the momentum factor.
Our conjecture about the correlation between a fund's liquidity-risk exposure and the investment skill of its management is consistent with the economic interpretation of the liquidity factor used for this study (the one proposed in Sadka (2006)). The microstructure literature discusses two main components of liquidity: a pure, non-informational cost component and a component that re ‡ects information asymmetry (see, e.g., Kyle (1985) ). Therefore, an exposure to aggregate liquidity risk theoretically re ‡ects two types of uncertainties, corresponding to each component of liquidity: uncertainty about noninformational transaction costs in the marketplace and uncertainty about market-wide information asymmetry. From a natural selection standpoint, a manager who chooses a high exposure to the uncertainty of market-wide information asymmetry may well pos-6 sess the skill to utilize private information (e.g., the aforementioned case of Warren Buffett). The liquidity measure used for this study is the permanent-variable price-impact measure of Sadka (2006) , which focuses on the information asymmetry component of market liquidity. We …nd that other liquidity-risk measures, such as Amihud (2002) , Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) , and the noninformational price-impact measure of Sadka (2006), which do not solely focus on the information asymmetry component, produce directionally consistent, albeit weaker (mostly insigni…cant) results (see, Dong (2011) for a detailed discussion and comparison of the three above-mentioned liquidity measures).
These …ndings lend further support for our conjecture pertaining to the correlation between a fund's liquidity beta and the investment skill of its management.
Another reason for why the Sadka factor produces more signi…cant results than other liquidity factors may stem from its construction based on systematic movements in volume-induced price impacts that do not reverse quickly. Such trading costs are particularly important for …nancial institutions because permanent price e¤ects limit their ability to reduce trading costs by splitting-up trades. The systematic nature of the liquidity factor also hampers the ability of these institutions to diversify their search for liquidity. Therefore, funds that are particularly averse to the uncertainty in the permanent component of price impact may be willing to pay a premium (i.e., underperform) to avoid such uncertainty. Taken together, the two attributes of the Sadka liquidity factor, i.e. its interpretation as an informational component of liquidity and its measurement based on permanent price e¤ects, might explain why it can predict fund performance more precisely than other liquidity factors. The …ndings therefore highlight the particular relevance of the liquidity factor used here to …nancial institutions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data used for this study. Section 3 investigates the relation between liquidity-risk exposure and the crosssection of individual-fund returns and presents the possibility that a fund's liquidity-risk exposure is correlated with its manager's skill to generate abnormal performance. Section 4 studies the manner by which liquidity risk pertains to some stylized facts documented in the mutual-fund literature. Section 5 provides some additional results, and Section 6 7 concludes.
Data
Monthly mutual-fund return data are obtained from the CRSP survivor-bias-free database for the period 1983-2009. Only funds that report returns on a monthly basis and net of all fees (management, incentive, and other expenses) are kept in the sample. Some fund families incubate many private funds and make historical performance available only for the funds that survive (Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2001) and Evans (2004) ).
In order to address the incubation bias in the data, we exclude the …rst 12-month fund returns. The removal of these young funds also alleviates a concern that these funds are more likely to be cross-subsidized by their respective fund families (Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2006) ). Consistent with prior studies, we exclude money-market funds and index funds. The returns are based on U.S. dollars and are excess of the risk-free rate.
The common-stock holding information for funds that hold equities is collected from the CDA/Spectrum Mutual Fund Holdings Database. The database provides common-stock holding information for all registered mutual funds that report their holdings to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Mutual-fund families introduced di¤erent share classes in the 1990s. Since di¤erent share classes have the same holding composition, we manually aggregate all the observations pertaining to di¤erent share classes into one observation. For the qualitative attributes of funds (e.g., name, objectives), we retain the observation of the oldest fund.
For the total-net-assets (TNA) under management, we sum the TNAs of the di¤erent share classes. Finally, for the other quantitative attributes of funds (e.g., returns, expenses, and loads), we compute the weighted average of the attributes of the individual share classes, where the weights are the lagged TNAs of the individual share classes.
The primary liquidity factor used here is based on the price-impact measures constructed in Sadka (2006) , which are extracted from tick-by-tick data. Of the four components of price impact, permanent-…xed, transitory-…xed, permanent-variable, and transitory-variable, estimated in Sadka (2006) , only the permanent-variable component is priced in the cross-section of momentum and post-earnings-announcement-drift portfolios. This paper therefore focuses on the permanent-variable component, henceforth simply referred to as the liquidity factor. In a later section, the transitory-…xed component is also investigated, along with other liquidity-risk measures including Amihud (2002) and Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) . Table 1 reports some summary statistics. The sample includes 13,700 mutual funds. 
Liquidity Risk and Fund Performance
This section investigates the ability of liquidity beta to predict performance in the crosssection of mutual funds. We form portfolios of individual mutual funds while allowing for time variation in liquidity loadings. The liquidity loading of a fund is calculated using a regression of the fund's monthly return on the market return and the liquidity factor. Following prior works that advocate estimating a fund's risk pro…le over a short period of time (e.g., Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) and Ellison (1997, 1999) ), we use a rolling window of 12 months in this section. In any given month, we only include funds with at least 11 non-missing return observations over the prior 12 months.
A one-year rolling window allows for time variation in systematic liquidity exposure year by year. The results using longer horizons are analyzed in a later section. 
Full-Sample Analysis
Panels A and B of Figure 1 plot returns and alphas of liquidity-loading deciles (in bars) along with the respective t-statistics (in symbols). Unless otherwise noted, the alphas reported in the paper are returns adjusted by the four factors MKT-RF, SMB, and HML of Fama and French (1993) , and UMD of Carhart (1997) . 6 The …gure shows that the high-liquidity-loading portfolio has the highest average next-month return, 0.57% (alpha=0.16%), while the low-liquidity-loading portfolio has the lowest average nextmonth return, 0.15% (alpha=-0.36%). The rest of the portfolio returns as well as alphas generally increase with the liquidity loading. The …gure also includes the high-minus-low 6 The four factors are obtained from Kenneth French's website.
10 liquidity-risk portfolio, whose next-month return is 0.42% and four-factor alpha is 0.51% (6.3% annually) with a t-statistic of 3.21. The signi…cant performance of the portfolio spread suggests that high-liquidity-loading funds signi…cantly outperform low-liquidityloading funds in the future. These results are also reported in Table 2 .
In addition to liquidity beta, the paper also examines whether fund exposures to the four systematic risk factors that are commonly used for explaining the time-series variation in mutual-fund returns can also explain the cross-section of future fund performance. Table 2 Since we focus on the entire mutual-fund universe, of which bond funds are also a large portion, we add several …xed-income factors to the four-factor model to calculate alphas. Following Sharpe (1992), we consider the Lehman Brothers Long-Term Treasury Bill Index returns, the Government Bond Index returns, Baa Corporate Bond Index returns, and a credit risk factor in the form of the spread between the Baa Index and the Treasury Index returns. Adding these factors to the four-factor model does not signi…cantly change the …ndings in Table 2 . Also, none of the factor loadings with respect to the …xed-income factors generates a positive spread in the cross-section of mutual-fund returns. For brevity, we only report the four-factor results in this paper.
Style Analysis
To provide some insight as to whether the high-minus-low return spread is driven by di¤erent investment styles, Table 3 reports the next-month performance of the liquidityloading-sorted portfolios separately using the funds in each investment style (these are dependent sorts; the funds in each style are divided into ten equal-size liquidity-beta groups each month). The results show that the four-factor alphas of the high-minus-low portfolios are signi…cantly positive for all investment-style groups. The results suggest that our …nding on the ability of liquidity risk to explain the cross-section of future mutual-fund returns does not stem from the di¤erence between investment styles.
Liquidity-Risk Premium or Managerial Skill?
We study whether the mutual-fund liquidity-beta return spread can be explained by compensation for a liquidity-risk premium. In Table 4 , we try to explain the high-minuslow liquidity-beta portfolio return spread for the overall sample and for each individual style by regressing the return spread on a …ve-factor model, that is the four-factor model plus a traded liquidity factor. The traded liquidity factor is constructed as the return of high-minus-low liquidity-beta deciles of equities, where liquidity beta is calculated through a regression of prior 12-month returns on the market factor and the nontraded liquidity factor. The results show that the return spread using all sample funds drops from 0.51% (four-factor alpha) to 0.41% (…ve-factor alpha) per month, which implies that roughly 20% of the outperformance of high-liquidity-beta funds relative to lowliquidity-beta funds can be explained by the liquidity-risk exposure. The results within individual styles are generally consistent with the result in the overall sample. We also use alternative ways to constructing traded liquidity factors by either using longer time windows to calculate prior liquidity beta while including the Fama-French factors and momentum as controls, or using other nontraded liquidity factors to estimate liquidity betas (by which a traded factor is formed). These alternative traded liquidity factors can explain much less of the outperformance of the high-minus-low liquidity-beta fund 12 portfolio.
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Overall, these …ndings suggest that liquidity beta can provide valuable information for investors insofar as manager selection. In contrast to the performance predictability of liquidity beta, fund return exposures to other risk factors do not predict performance.
Moreover, a high liquidity-risk exposure of a fund during the ranking period might not imply that part of its future performance is earned through a liquidity-risk premium.
Instead, the performance seems to point to the ability of the fund's manager to generate performance over and beyond that which is explained by the fund's systematic risk exposures during the holding period. In sum, the evidence advance that a fund's liquidity beta can predict two sources of performance that are of interest to mutual-fund investors, managerial skill and return compensation for bearing liquidity risk, where most of the performance stems from the former (80%) and only a small portion (at most 20%) is explained by the latter.
Do High-Liquidity-Beta Funds hold High-Liquidity-Beta Stocks?
To further investigate the fund-performance attribution results in the previous section, we obtain the stock holdings of individual funds for the sample period, 1983-2009. Figure   2 plots the relation between the liquidity-beta ranking of funds in the fund universe and the liquidity-beta ranking of funds'stock holdings in the stock universe. In Panel A, on the left-hand side, funds are sorted into decile portfolios according to their liquidity beta, which is calculated using a regression of prior 12 monthly fund returns on the market portfolio and the liquidity factor. On the right-hand side, all the stocks in the CRSP stock universe are also sorted into decile portfolios according to their liquidity beta, where, similar to funds'liquidity beta, the liquidity beta of a stock is calculated using a regression of prior 12 monthly stock returns on the market portfolio and the liquidity 7 In unreported tests we also replace the equity-based traded liquidity factor with two bond-based traded liquidity factors constructed in Lin, Wang, and Wu (2010). These traded portfolios are based on bond beta spreads with respect to market liquidity as measured in Amihud (2002) or Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) . Due to data limitations, the time series of these factors begin in 1994. The results show that the mutual-fund liquidity-beta return spread does not signi…cantly load on either bond-based liquidity factors. 13 factor. The arrow that links a fund decile to a stock decile indicates the average decile rank of the fund-decile stock holdings in the stock universe. For example, for Decile 1 of funds, the liquidity betas of the stocks that the funds in this decile hold are on average ranked Decile 4 in the stock universe, thus an arrow linking Decile 1 of funds to Decile 4 of stocks.
In Panel B, the horizontal axis includes the fund decile portfolios sorted by fund liquidity beta, while the vertical axis reports (in cubics symbols) the average decile ranks of the fund-decile stock holdings in the CRSP stock universe. The plot also includes the four-standard-deviation range around the average (the bars around each cubic symbol), where the standard deviation is the cross-sectional standard deviation of the average decile ranks of individual funds'stock holdings across the funds in each fund liquiditybeta decile in each month averaged over all months.
One explanation for the existence of a liquidity-beta return spread in the cross-section of mutual funds might be that high-liquidity-beta funds (Decile 10 in the fund universe) hold high-liquidity-beta stocks (Decile 10 in the stock universe) while low-liquidity-beta funds (Decile 1 in the fund universe) hold low-liquidity-beta stocks (Decile 1 in the stock universe). This would imply that the return spread observed in mutual funds is a manifestation of the liquidity-beta return spread in stocks, that is the liquidity-risk premium. However, Figure 2 refutes this simple explanation, because the funds in every liquidity-beta-sorted fund decile hold stocks that are, on average, ranked between Decile in the stock universe. This increase, however, is far from a one-to-one relation between a fund's liquidity beta ranking and the average ranking of its holdings (the dotted 45 degree line on Panel B of the …gure). The return spread between Decile 6 stock portfolio and Decile 4 stock portfolio, which is the liquidity-risk premium di¤erence between the stocks residing in Decile 6 and Decile 4, is 0.05% per month, only a fraction of the return spread between Decile 10 fund portfolio and Decile 1 fund portfolio (0.51%). It follows that the liquidity-beta return spread of mutual funds cannot be explained by the relatively small di¤erence in the average liquidity-risk exposure of their reported equity holdings. This result is consistent with the previous …nding that the traded liquidity factor can account for only a small part of the observed liquidity-beta return spread in the cross-section of funds.
In addition to a comparison of the rankings of liquidity betas in the fund universe and in the stock universe, in unreported results, we also verify that the average estimated liquidity beta of the funds in each decile is quite similar to the average liquidity beta of the equity holdings of these funds. Although we do not have access to information about the non-equity holdings of mutual funds, the fact that the liquidity beta of a fund is similar to that of its equity holdings suggests that the liquidity beta of the non-equity holdings should be close in magnitude to that of the equity holdings, as well as to that of the entire fund, because the beta of a fund is the weighted average of the betas of its equity and non-equity holdings.
To conclude, it seems that in order to be ranked in liquidity-beta Decile 10 in the fund universe, a fund only needs to hold a portfolio with a mildly higher average liquidity beta than other funds. The outperformance of the high-liquidity-beta funds therefore cannot be explained by the small liquidity-risk premium di¤erence between portfolios with mildly di¤erent liquidity betas, but rather by the possibility that the managers of these funds have the ability to select assets that are undervalued, which also tend to, on average, have higher liquidity risk.
Are Funds Skilled in Timing Liquidity Risk?
To gain further insight as to the type of ability or skill that generates the relative outperformance of high-liquidity-beta funds, this section investigates the time variation of the exposure of the fund liquidity-beta return spread to the traded liquidity factor. As argued in the previous section, the fund return spread is largely not due to a liquidityrisk premium, on average, over time. Yet, a salient feature of high-liquidity-beta assets is that they tend to signi…cantly underperform during liquidity crises while substantially rebounding during post-crisis periods. Thus, a high-liquidity-beta fund can outperform by timing its holdings exposures to the liquidity factor, that is, holding low-liquidityexposure assets during crisis periods and high-liquidity-exposure assets after crises. Although both timing and security-selection abilities are important skills of fund managers, the alphas reported in Table 4 can be viewed as pure measures of funds'security-selection ability only if the funds lack signi…cant timing ability (see, e.g., Henriksson and Merton (1981) and Jagannathan and Korajczyk (1986) ).
Therefore, in Table 5 , we investigate whether the returns to the high-minus-low liquidity-beta fund portfolio imply a managerial ability to time the exposure to assets with high liquidity risk. In the spirit of the timing model of Henriksson and Merton (1981) , we add the term Max(0, -LIQ) to the …ve-factor model in Table 4 (LIQ is the traded liquidity factor). In contrast to the ability to time the exposure to the market return studied in Henriksson and Merton (1981) , we focus on the ability to time the exposure to the traded liquidity factor. A positive (negative) regression coe¢ cient on Max(0, -LIQ) suggests that the liquidity-beta fund return spread signi…es an ability to time liquidity exposure in the right (wrong) direction, that is, having a lower (higher) exposure to liquidity risk during negative liquidity events. Note that the regression intercepts of the timing tests in Table 5 can no longer be interpreted as measures of performance (see, e.g., Ferson (2009)). The results indicate a slightly negative timing ability overall. Using all funds, the coe¢ cient of the liquidity-timing term, Max(0, -LIQ), is negative with a t-statistic of -1.79. This is mostly driven by a signi…cantly negative timing ability of Growth funds, which display a signi…cantly negative coe¢ cient on the liquidity-timing term. The …ndings suggest that high-liquidity-beta funds do not have better ability to time exposure to high liquidity-risk assets than low-liquidity-beta funds, on a monthly basis. This is quite reasonable given the fact that liquidity crises tend to emerge as sudden, unpredictable shocks and that most …nancial institutions were not able to avoid severe losses during past liquidity crises.
To further con…rm the time-varying property of the high-minus-low liquidity-beta fund portfolio performance, Figure 3 partitions the sample period into quintiles based on the realized returns of the traded liquidity factor. The top (bottom) quintile includes the months for which the factor return is in the top (bottom) 20% of its distribution.
The middle quintile (Quintile 3) includes the months with low liquidity risk, where there are neither large positive nor large negative liquidity shocks. The alpha in each month is the constant plus the residual from the four-or …ve-factor model used to evaluate the high-minus-low fund portfolio performance for the entire sample period. The …gure shows that the four-factor alpha of the portfolio increases from signi…cantly negative, when market liquidity condition is low (bottom quintile), to signi…cantly positive, when market liquidity condition is high (top quintile), indicating that the performance (before adjusting for funds' liquidity-risk exposure) covaries with market liquidity conditions. However, once fund performance is adjusted by the …ve-factor model with the traded liquidity factor included, the adjusted performance is no longer positively correlated with market liquidity conditions. In fact, only the average monthly …ve-factor alpha in Quintile 3 is signi…cant (alpha = 0:81% per month and t = 3:25), suggesting that the high-minus-low liquidity-beta funds generate most of their performance when there are little liquidity shocks (Quintile 3). This result con…rms that the outperformance is due neither to taking high liquidity risk nor to short-term timing of liquidity-risk exposure on a monthly basis.
To summarize, the evidence suggest that the outperformance of high-liquidity-beta funds is largely not a re ‡ection of a liquidity-risk premium, but rather it signi…es a superior managerial skill to generate abnormal performance in the long-run. This ability is especially noticeable during periods that exhibit no large unexpected market-wide liquidity variations.
Perhaps the conclusions in this section and the previous one could be illustrated through a recent example brie ‡y mentioned in the introduction, that is Warren Buffett's recent investment in Goldman Sachs (GS). In the midst of the liquidity crisis, in September of 2008, Bu¤ett's asset-management …rm, Berkshire Hathaway-essentially a closed-end fund-decides to invest $5 billion in GS with the belief that GS is undervalued.
Due to the general condition of the …nancial sector during that time, GS exhibits only a mildly higher liquidity beta than the average …rm (its stock liquidity beta is ranked Thus, by investing in GS instead of holding cash, Bu¤ett actually increases his fund's liquidity-risk exposure during the crisis. The imperfect timing is ultimately surmounted by about 14% return per year that the GS deal delivers to Bu¤ett, which is signi…-cantly higher than the risk premium of the liquidity-beta Decile 6 stock portfolio. This deal exhibits Bu¤ett's ability to generate abnormal returns that are beyond the normal liquidity-risk premium that average stocks with similar liquidity risk can deliver, but does not provide much evidence of his ability to time his fund's liquidity-risk exposure on a monthly basis. If some mutual-fund managers are similarly skillful investors as Warren Bu¤ett, then sorting funds by their liquidity beta is likely to identify such managers.
Liquidity Beta and Fund Characteristics
This subsection provides some additional analyses supporting the notion that a fund's liquidity-risk exposure could be related to its ability to generate abnormal performance.
First, we examine the fund characteristics of each liquidity-beta decile, which are reported in Table 6 . The table shows that both high-liquidity-beta funds (Decile 10) and low-liquidity-beta funds (Decile 1) charge signi…cantly higher fees (an average expense ratio of 1.3%) than funds with average liquidity beta (the average expense ratio of funds in Decile 5 is 0.9%). Since a typical passive index fund charges much lower fees (less than 0.5%), the results regarding the expense ratios suggest that both high-and low-liquiditybeta funds are relatively active. They also trade more frequently (higher turnover ratios) and tend to be smaller than funds with average liquidity beta, providing further evidence that such funds are relatively active.
These results are inconsistent with the hypothesis that high-liquidity-beta funds are more active, take more risk, and earn high returns, while low-liquidity-beta funds are more passive, take less risk, and earn low returns. Therefore, a risk-based explanation is unlikely to explain the outperformance of the high-minus-low liquidity-beta fund portfolio. Yet, active funds are not necessarily skillful funds. As both high-and low-liquidity beta funds tend to be more active, the …ndings suggest that funds'liquidity-risk exposure can assist investors to distinguish between the active funds that tend to outperform (highliquidity-beta funds) and those that tend to underperform (low-liquidity-beta funds) in future periods.
To provide further supporting evidence for the conclusion that a fund's liquidity beta is correlated with managerial talent, we also examine index funds. If funds' liquidity beta re ‡ects the liquidity-risk premium rather than skill, we would expect that highliquidity-beta index funds outperform low-liquidity-beta index funds in a similar manner as in non-index funds. However, using decile sorts of individual index funds, we …nd that high-liquidity-beta index funds do not outperform low-liquidity-beta index funds.
The liquidity betas of the high-and low-liquidity-beta index-fund deciles are close in value to those of the high-and low-liquidity-beta non-index-fund deciles, respectively. This indicates that the liquidity-risk-exposure-induced outperformance is a phenomenon associated with actively managed fund rather than funds that passively follow an index.
Since passive funds, in principle, are not supposed to involve signi…cant managerial skill, the …nding supports that the outperformance of high-liquidity-beta funds is related to the ability of the fund managers to generate abnormal performance.
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Liquidity Risk and Other Performance E¤ects
The previous sections explore the relation between a mutual fund's liquidity-risk exposure and its future performance. A large body of literature documents that mutual-fund future performance can also be predicted by other mutual-fund characteristics such as past return, past ‡ow, and size. This section therefore explores the relation of liquidity risk and these other stylized facts about fund characteristics and future performance.
Performance Persistence
If a fund's liquidity-risk exposure is correlated with its manager's skill, fund performance should be relatively persistent, as skillful or unskillful managers should repeat themselves at least in the short-run. In this subsection, we examine the e¤ect of liquidity risk on mutual-fund future performance with a focus on the performance-persistence e¤ect documented by Carhart (1997) . Carhart …nds that sorting funds based on their prior-year returns is useful for predicting their' future performance: Winners continue to outperform while losers continue to underperform during a short period post portfolio formation. Carhart shows that while a fund's momentum beta during the ranking period does not predict the fund's performance persistence during the holding period, a momentum factor exposure during the portfolio holding period can explain a large part of this return persistence e¤ect, that is the magnitude and signi…cance of the return spread between winner and loser funds is signi…cantly reduced after adjusting returns using the momentum risk factor.
Our measure of fund liquidity risk is constructed in a manner that facilitates a study of its relation to the prior-year-return persistence e¤ect because it is estimated using past 12-month returns. In particular, the liquidity beta of fund i for period t = 0 is estimated using the following rolling regression over t = 12::: 1: 
where the residual term in (1) vanishes because the average of the 12-month residuals is constructed to be zero based on the 12-month rolling regression in (1) . If sorting past 12-month returns predicts cross-sectional return di¤erences across mutual funds, then this predictive ability must stem from the three components that decompose past returns,
i.e., \ Const i , b i;M KT , or b i;Liq , which are the estimates of the regression (1). Therefore, this decomposition enables the identi…cation of the source of the predictability that past 12-month returns have toward fund future performance.
We …rst verify that return persistence exists in our sample. Similar to Carhart (1997), we sort funds into decile portfolios based on their average past 12-month returns. We then examine strategies with di¤erent post-ranking holding horizons. Speci…cally, similar to the portfolio construction approach of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), the average returns of multiple portfolios with the same holding horizon are calculated. For example, the January return of a three-month holding period return is an average of the January returns of three portfolios that are constructed in October, November, and December of the previous year. We also calculate the return di¤erence between the winner fund portfolio (Decile 10) and the loser fund portfolio (Decile 1) for each holding horizon. Carhart (1997) documents return persistence, before adjusting returns using the momentum factor. The results in Table 7 indicate that the raw returns of the winner portfolio outperform those of the loser portfolio for holding periods of up to six months post formation. The Fama-French three-factor alpha of the winner portfolio is signi…-cantly higher than that of the loser portfolio for holding periods of up to 12 months post formation. For the one-month holding period strategy, past-12-month winner funds sig-ni…cantly outperform loser funds even adjusting for the four factors, although the return spread (adjusted by Fama-French three factors) drops by more than half, from 0.98% to 0.34%, after adding the momentum factor. Its signi…cance is also weakened, with the t-statistic dropping from 3.77 to 2.01, respectively.
After con…rming the performance-persistence e¤ect in our sample for holding periods of up to 12 months, we examine which component of the average past 12-month fund returns predicts the cross-sectional di¤erences in future returns. Table 7 reports the 10-minus-1 return spread based on each of the three components of past 12-month returns.
For the one-month holding period strategy, where the return-persistence e¤ect remains even after controlling for the four factors, the results show that only the liquidity beta generates a four-factor risk-adjusted return di¤erence in the cross-section of funds. For other holding horizons, where the return-persistence e¤ect remains after controlling for the Fama-French three factors, the power of predicting a three-factor risk-adjusted return di¤erence in the cross-section of funds still mainly stems from the liquidity beta. In fact, for all holding horizons, fund market beta has a reverse implication for funds' future performance, that is, funds that are more sensitive to market risk earn lower returns.
Overall, the results show that the ability of past returns to predict future fund performance mainly stems from the liquidity-risk exposure of the past 12-month fund returns.
Carhart …nds that funds with high-momentum loadings do not outperform those with low-momentum loadings (which also holds in our sample, as shown in Table 2 ). His explanation for the return-persistence e¤ect is therefore that winner funds happen to load (by luck) on momentum winners during the portfolio holding period. Our results show that performance persistence occurs only in conjunction with liquidity risk: Funds with high returns in year t tend to outperform during year t + 1 if year-t returns are mainly driven by a high exposure to liquidity risk. Given the association of liquidity beta with skill, as discussed above, another interpretation for these results is that skill-related performance seems to persist. 
The Fund-Size E¤ect
The fund-size e¤ect is documented in Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik (2004) . They …nd that small funds have better ability to generate abnormal performance than large funds, and o¤er an explanation based on the liquidity level of their underlying positions. Since individual-fund liquidity may have a common, systematic component, we examine the relation between fund size and systematic liquidity risk.
To alleviate the concern that the liquidity-beta return spread is due to the fund-size e¤ect, we …rst remove funds with TNAs less than 15 million dollars each month. We then sort the remaining funds into …ve portfolios according to fund size (TNA) and then into …ve portfolios according to fund liquidity beta, estimated using the prior 12 months. Table 8 shows that the return spread of the high-minus-low liquidity-beta portfolio is signi…cant in all size quintiles, suggesting that fund size does not explain the liquiditybeta e¤ect. Table 8 also con…rms the fund-size e¤ect in the last column. The largest fund quintile underperform the smallest fund quintile by 0.08% (four-factor alpha) per month (tstatistic of 2.41). However, taken alone, fund size is only helpful in identifying the funds that underperform (the largest funds); the smallest fund quintile does not earn a positive alpha. To help investors predict outperforming funds, it is important to consider fund size in conjunction with liquidity-risk exposure, that is, small funds with high liquidity-risk exposure tend to outperform. For example, the smallest size and highest liquidity-beta funds have a positive alpha of 0.23% per month with t-statistic of 2.55.
In addition, the double-sort results show that the fund-size e¤ect is signi…cant only among the most liquidity sensitive funds (within the highest liquidity-beta quintile, large funds underperform small funds by 0.15% per month with a t-statistic of -2.67). To further investigate this result, we partition the sample into liquidity-crisis periods and non-crisis periods. Since liquidity crises are rare events, we classify months for which the liquidity factor innovations belong to the bottom 20% of the distribution as a proxy for focus on the one-year return-persistence e¤ect alone. months of liquidity crises and the rest of the months in the sample period are de…ned as non-crisis periods. In unreported results, we …nd that large, high-liquidity-beta funds experience more losses during severe market liquidity conditions (crisis periods) than small funds with similar liquidity-risk exposures; their performance nevertheless does not recover as much as small funds when market liquidity conditions improve (non-crisis periods). This suggests that large funds are not su¢ ciently ‡exible to respond to signi…cant variations in market-wide liquidity conditions, limiting their ability to generate performance. The fund-size e¤ect is not present in funds with low liquidity betas, suggesting that size does not signi…cantly matter for funds whose returns are insensitive to market liquidity variations.
In sum, while Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik (2004) argue that the fund-size e¤ect is likely caused by large funds'lack of ability to avoid high transaction costs due to the idiosyncratic illiquidity of their underlying positions, our results suggest that the lack of ability of large funds to handle a high exposure to systematic liquidity risk is another source of the diseconomies of scale.
The Smart-Money E¤ect
The …nal e¤ect that we study is the smart-money e¤ect, that is, funds that experience investor in ‡ow subsequently outperform funds that experience investor out ‡ow (see, e.g., Gruber (1996) and Zheng (1999)). As fund ‡ow can generate price pressure on the underlying securities it holds (e.g., Coval and Sta¤ord (2007) ), it is natural to examine the relation between the smart-money e¤ect and aggregate liquidity conditions. Following the literature, the percentage net ‡ow to fund i during month t is measured as
where T N A i;t is measured at the end of month t, R i;t is the fund's return for month t, and M ergeT N A i;t is the increase in the TNA due to mergers during month t.
In Table 9 , funds are …rst sorted into those with in ‡ows versus those with out ‡ows during the previous month. Within each group, funds are further sorted into …ve portfolios based on fund liquidity beta, measured using the prior 12 months. The results
show that the liquidity-beta return spread is present in both in ‡ow and out ‡ow funds.
Note that out ‡ow funds seem more constrained than in ‡ow funds in choosing assets with di¤erent liquidity-risk exposures because the liquidity-beta return spread among out ‡ow funds is smaller and less signi…cant than that of in ‡ow funds (the four-factor alpha is 0.35% and 0.60%, respectively, with t-statistics of 2.84 and 3.71). One possible explanation is that funds with out ‡ows may require managers to liquidate positions quickly, while funds with in ‡ows may choose to slowly engage capital into new investments.
In unreported results, we con…rm the smart-money e¤ect: in ‡ow funds outperform out ‡ow funds by 0.19% per month (Fama-French three-factor alpha) with a t-statistic of 2.37. Sapp and Tiwari (2004) argue that momentum can explain the smart-money e¤ect. Their argument is also con…rmed in our sample: after including the momentum factor, the performance (four-factor alpha) di¤erence between in ‡ow and out ‡ow funds becomes insigni…cant.
Yet, when the information about funds'liquidity-risk exposure is utilized, the doublesort results show that the smart-money e¤ect is signi…cant among the high-liquidity-beta funds. The fund- ‡ow return spread in the high-liquidity-beta group remains signi…cant after controlling for the momentum factor, with a four-factor alpha of 0.25% and a tstatistic of 2.91. Notably, the high-liquidity-beta funds with recent in ‡ows earn a positive alpha of 0.36% per month (t-statistic of 3.08), even after controlling for the momentum factor. Low-liquidity-beta, out ‡ow funds can also predict signi…cant underperformance.
Additional Tests
Alternative Liquidity-Risk Measures
It is well recognized that liquidity can be measured in various ways, and di¤erent measures may capture di¤erent aspects of liquidity (see Korajczyk and Sadka (2008) ). We conjecture that the correlation between fund liquidity beta and managerial ability stems from the fact that liquidity risk re ‡ects two types of uncertainties--uncertainty about pure, non-informational transaction costs in the marketplace and uncertainty about market-wide information asymmetry. The liquidity measure used for this study is the permanent-variable price-impact measure of Sadka (2006), which focuses on the information asymmetry component of market liquidity (see, e.g., Kyle (1985) ). From a natural selection standpoint, a manager who chooses a higher exposure to the uncertainty of market-wide information asymmetry may well have the skill to utilize private information.
Therefore, the analysis in this section repeats the liquidity-loading portfolio sorts while using several other measures of liquidity risk: the Amihud (2002) Replacing the traded liquidity factor in Table 4 with the traded Amihud factor or the traded Pástor-Stambaugh factor also shows consistent, but weaker e¤ects pertaining to the liquidity-beta return spread. That is, although the liquidity loadings of the liquiditybeta return spread are still signi…cantly positive, the reduction of the risk-adjusted return spread from using the four-factor model to using the …ve-factor model is smaller than that reported in Table 4 .
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In addition, the liquidity factor measures systematic movements in volume-induced 9 The Amihud-based measure is a non-traded liquidity-risk factor constructed following the procedure outlined in Acharya and Pedersen (2005) . The Pástor-Stambaugh measure is the non-traded liquidityrisk factor obtained from Pástor's website. 10 The traded Amihud liquidity factor is constructed as the decile return spread of liquidity beta of equities, where liquidity beta is calculated through a regression of prior 12-month (or 60-month) returns on the market factor (or the Fama-French four factors) and the nontraded Amihud liquidity factor. The traded Pástor-Stambaugh factor is obtained from Pástor's website. price impacts that do not reverse quickly, while the Amihud factor focuses on total contemporaneous volume-induced price impact and the Pástor-Stambaugh factor focuses on volume-induced price impacts that reverse the following trading day (see, e.g., Dong (2011) for a detailed discussion). Permanent price impacts are particularly important for large …nancial institutions because they limit the ability to reduce trading costs by splitting-up trades across multiple periods. The systematic nature of the liquidity factor also hampers the ability of these institutions to diversify their search for liquidity.
Therefore, funds that are especially averse to the uncertainty in the permanent component of price impact may be willing to pay a premium (i.e., underperform) to avoid such uncertainty. Taken together, the two attributes of the Sadka liquidity factor, i.e. its interpretation as an informational component of liquidity and its permanent e¤ect, might explain why it can predict performance more precisely than other liquidity factors.
These results therefore highlight the particular relevance of the main liquidity factor used here for …nancial institutions.
Liquidity Level and Liquidity Risk
Although this paper focuses on liquidity risk, the liquidity level and the liquidity risk of a fund may be related. In unreported results, we also evaluate the robustness of our …ndings to controlling for fund-level liquidity in two ways. First, we compute fundlevel liquidity using the return-autocorrelation measure advanced in Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) and Khandani and Lo (2009) . Sorting funds …rst by fund-level liquidity and then by liquidity beta, we …nd that the liquidity-beta return spread remains signi…cant.
Second, we construct an illiquidity return spread as the return of high-minus-low Amihud illiquidity measure deciles of equities. We then try to explain our liquidity-beta return spread using an augmented …ve-factor model (the four factors plus the Amihudbased illiquidity return spread). The results indicate that the liquidity-beta return spread does not signi…cantly load on the Amihud-based illiquidity return spread, and the alpha of the liquidity-beta return spread using the …ve-factor model is quite similar to that of the four-factor model. The analysis therefore suggests that our main results are not driven by fund-level liquidity.
Longer Holding and Ranking Periods
The analyses in this paper are mainly based on liquidity-beta-sorted portfolios that are held for a period of one month. This section examines the performance of the liquiditybeta return spread over longer holding periods. Table 11 , Panel A, reports the results. We follow the portfolio construction approach of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) . Speci…cally, the table utilizes average returns of multiple portfolios with the same holding horizon.
For example, the January return of a three-month holding period strategy is an average of the January returns of three liquidity-risk portfolios that are constructed in October, November, and December of the previous year. The results indicate that the highliquidity-beta portfolio outperforms the low-liquidity-beta portfolio for up to 60 months.
Yet, the performance of the high-minus-low liquidity-loading portfolio decreases over long holding horizons; it is signi…cant for holding periods equal to or less than 12 months.
The …nding is consistent with Berk and Green (2004) , who advance an explanation for the lack of long-lived performance persistence, even in the presence of managerial skill (note that the performance-persistence section highlights that return is persistent only within a year post portfolio formation).
We also examine the performance of liquidity-beta portfolios using longer rolling windows to calculate fund liquidity beta. Table 11 , Panel B, repeats the analysis of Table 3 , while using liquidity betas that are constructed based on 12, 24, 36, 48, and 60 prior monthly returns. At any given period of time, funds with non-missing returns for at least 11, 18, 24, 36, and 48 months are used, respectively. The results demonstrate that the liquidity-beta return spread decreases with the ranking period and remains signi…cant for rolling windows of up to 36 months. The insigni…cant liquidity-beta return spread for rolling windows of over 36 months seems similar to that using the momentum factor. Carhart (1997) …nds that funds that follow a long-term momentum strategy do not outperform funds that follow a long-term contrarian strategy. These …ndings suggest that short-term liquidity-beta measures are more precise in predicting future fund performance. The di¤erence between the performance predictability of long-and short-term liquidity beta supports the notion that a high-liquidity beta can signify a fund manager's superior investment skill. If a fund manager has a consistent strategy to generate performance by simply earning a liquidity-risk premium, then one would not expect the fund to change its liquidity-risk exposure quickly over time. The fact that although funds choose a short period of time to be exposed to liquidity risk and then outperform in the subsequent year suggests that the fund manager may know some additional information, and the outperformance is not simply due to a liquidity-risk premium. Management skill (to generate risk-adjusted performance) once again emerges as a likely explanation.
Subperiod Analysis
Last, to further examine the time-varying property of the liquidity-beta return spread, we split the sample into two equally long subperiods and conduct a subperiod analysis using the same methodology as in Table 2 . Panels A and B of Table 12 report the results of the subperiods 1984-1997 and 1998-2009 , respectively. The liquidity-beta return/alpha spread is present in both early and recent subperiods. The liquidity-beta return spread is therefore not driven by a particular subperiod.
Conclusion
This paper highlights the importance of considering funds' liquidity-risk exposure as an a determinant of the cross-section of mutual-fund performance. Funds with a high liquidity-risk exposure earn signi…cantly high future returns during 1984-2009. However, only a fraction of the outperformance of high-liquidity-beta funds relative to lowliquidity-beta funds can be explained by systematic risk factors, suggesting that most of this outperformance may stem from funds'ability/skill to generate abnormal performance. The liquidity-risk-exposure e¤ect is also related to several other documented e¤ects, such as return persistence, fund size, and smart money.
The results of this study have several implications. First, since we …nd that fund exposures to liquidity risk generate an alpha spread in the cross-section of mutual funds, which we largely associate with investment skill, this paper o¤ers means by which investors can select mutual-fund managers. In contrast, funds' past-return exposures to other risk factors do not exhibit such performance predictability. Second, as the liquidity-riskexposure e¤ect can account for a large part of several other stylized e¤ects, it is important for investors to examine these other fund characteristics together with fund liquidity-risk exposure in order to predict mutual-fund performance. Finally, from a risk-management standpoint, the paper o¤ers an additional tool for evaluating the liquidity-risk exposure of mutual funds. (Panel B) or for all funds (Panel C) . The rest of the statistics (minimum; 1, 25, 50, 75, and 99 percentiles; maximum; and standard deviation) Each month mutual funds are sorted into ten equally weighted portfolios according to various historical factor betas. The factor beta is calculated using a regression of monthly portfolio returns on the market portfolio and the factor (other than the market portfolio itself), using the 12 months prior to portfolio formation. Portfolio returns begin from April 1984, using funds with at least 11 months of returns during the prior years. The factors analyzed are the FamaFrench three factors (MKT, SMB, and HML), the momentum factor (UMD) of Carhart (1997) , and the liquidity factor. The table reports the average monthly excess return (in percent) of the decile portfolios, as well as of the high-minus-low portfolio. Risk-adjusted return (alpha; in percent) is the return adjusted by Fama-French four factors. T-statistics are reported in square brackets. The sample includes the CRSP mutual-fund universe for the period April 1983 to December 2009. Each month mutual funds are sorted into ten equally weighted portfolios according to historical liquidity beta. The liquidity beta is calculated using a regression of monthly portfolio returns on the market portfolio and the Sadka factor, using the 12 months prior to portfolio formation. Portfolio returns begin April 1984, using funds with at least 11 months of returns during the prior years. The portfolios are separately formed using mutual funds in particular investment styles. The table reports the average monthly excess return and the risk-adjusted return, i.e., alpha (in percent) of the decile portfolios, as well as the high-minus-low portfolio. Alphas are returns adjusted by Fama-French three factors (MKT, SMB, and HML) and the momentum factor (UMD) of Carhart (1997) . T-statistics are reported in square brackets. The sample includes the CRSP mutual-fund universe for the period April 1983 to December 2009. where R i,t is the high-minus-low liquidity-beta portfolio return in all sample or in particular investment styles. The independent variables include the Fama-French three factors (MKT, SMB, and HML), the momentum factor (UMD) of Carhart (1997) , the traded liquidity factor (LIQ), and a timing-related term max(0, -LIQ). The traded liquidity factor is constructed as the value-weighted return spread of high-minuslow liquidity beta deciles of equities, where liquidity beta is calculated through a regression of prior 12-month returns on the market factor and the nontraded Sadka permenent-variable liquidity factor. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. This table summarizes the average characteristics of the liquidity-beta sorted mutual fund decile portfolios. The liquidity-factor beta is calculated using a regression of monthly portfolio returns on the market portfolio and the liquidity factor, using the 12 months prior to portfolio formation. The differences in characteristics are computed on a monthly basis using Newey-West standard errors with a lag length of 12 months. T-statistics are reported in square brackets. The sample includes the CRSP mutual-fund universe for the period April 1983 to December 2009. where r i,t is mutual fund i's return at time t, r MKTt is the market return at time t, Liq t denotes the non-traded liquidity factor value at time t, and ɛ i,t is the residual term; all returns are excess of the risk-free rate. Based on the above regression, a funds' average past 12-month returns can be decomposed into three components as follows:
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Sorting Variable
In each of the sorting criterion column below, funds are sorted into ten decile portfolios based on the average past 12-month returns, the constant term, the market beta term, and the liquidity beta term, respectively. Strategies with post-ranking holding periods of 1 month, 3 months, 6 months, and 12 months are examined. The monthly returns of longer holding-period strategies are calculated from an equal weighted average of the monthly returns of a series of portfolios. For example, the return of Decile 1 of the 3-month holding period strategy on January is an equal weighted average of the January returns of the Decile 1 portfolios sorted in December, November, and October of the previous year. T-statistics are reported in square brackets. 3-Factor Alpha are monthly returns adjusted by Fama-French three factors (MKT, SMB, and HML). 4-Factor Alpha are monthly returns adjusted by Fama-French three factors (MKT, SMB, and HML) and the momentum factor (UMD) of Carhart (1997) . The sample includes the CRSP mutual-fund universe for the period April 1983 to December 2009. Individual fund betas are estimated using the following regression of past 12-month returns on the market factor and the liquidity risk factor. Table 8 Liquidity Beta Portfolios Each month mutual funds are first sorted into five portfolios according to their size and then sorted into five portfolios according to their liquidity factor betas within each size portfolio. The liquidity-factor beta is calculated using a regression of monthly portfolio returns on the market portfolio and the liquidity factor, using the 12 months prior to portfolio formation. Portfolio returns begin from April 1984, using funds with at least 11 months of returns during the prior years. The table reports the average monthly excess return (in percent) of the liquidity-beta and the fund-size quintile portfolios, as well as of the high-minus-low liquidity-beta and the large-minus-small fund size portfolios. Alphas are four-factor alphas, where returns are adjusted by Fama-French three factors (MKT, SMB, and HML) and the momentum factor (UMD) of Carhart (1997 The High-Minus-Low Liquidity-Beta Decile Return Spreads Using Alternative Liquidity-Risk Measures Table 10 Each month hedge funds are sorted into ten equally weighted portfolios according to historical liquidity beta. The liquidity beta is calculated using a regression of monthly portfolio returns on the market portfolio and a liquidity factor, using the 12 months prior to portfolio formation. The non-traded liquidity-risk factors are Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) , the Amihud (2002) measure, and the permanent-variable and transitory-fixed components of price impact in Sadka (2006) . The table reports the average monthly return (in percent) and risk-adjusted return (alpha; in percent) of the high-minus-low decile portfolio spread for the entire sample period. Alpha is the return adjusted by Fama-French three factors (MKT, SMB, and HML) and the momentum factor (UMD) of Carhart (1997 Liquidity portfolios with different holding or ranking periods are reported. In Panel A, each month mutual funds are first sorted into ten equally weighted portfolios according to historical liquidity beta. The monthly returns of longer holdingperiod strategies are calculated from an equal weighted average of a series of liquidity beta sorted portfolios. For example, the return of Decile 1 of the 3-month holding period strategy on January is an equal weighted average of the January returns of the Decile 1 portfolios sorted in December, November, and October of the previous year. The liquidity beta is calculated using a regression of monthly portfolio returns on the market portfolio and the Sadka factor, using the 12 months prior to portfolio formation. Portfolio returns begin April 1984, using funds with at least 11 months of returns during the prior years. In Panel B, each month mutual funds are sorted into ten equally weighted portfolios according to the historical Sadka liquidity factor beta. The factor beta is calculated using a regression of monthly portfolio returns on the market portfolio and the factor, using the 12, 24, 36, 48, 60 months prior to portfolio formation respectively. Portfolio returns begin from April 1984 , April 1985 , April 1986 , April 1987 , and April 1988 , and 48 months of returns during the prior years.The table reports the monthly returns (in percent) for the decile portfolios, as well as the returns and alphas (returns adjusted by Fama-French three factors (MKT, SMB, and HML) and the momentum factor (UMD) of Carhart (1997) ) for the high-minus-low portfolio. T-statistics are reported in square brackets. The sample includes the CRSP mutual-fund universe for the period April 1983 to December 2009. Each month mutual funds are sorted into ten equally weighted portfolios according to the historical Sadka liquidity factor beta. The factor beta is calculated using a regression of monthly portfolio returns on the market portfolio and the factor, using the 12 months prior to portfolio formation. Portfolio returns begin from April 1984, using funds with at least 11 months of returns during the prior years. The table reports the average monthly excess return (in percent) of the decile portfolios, as well as of the high-minus-low portfolio. Alphas are returns adjusted by Fama-French three factors (MKT, SMB, and HML) and the momentum factor (UMD) of Carhart (1997) . T-statistics are reported in square brackets. The sample includes the CRSP mutual-fund universe for the period April 1983 to December 2009. (Panel B) of liquidity risk sorted portfolios as well as the high-minus-low portfolio. Each month mutual funds are first sorted into ten equally weighted portfolios according to historical liquidity beta. The liquidity beta is calculated using a regression of monthly portfolio returns on the market portfolio and the Sadka factor, using the 12 months prior to portfolio formation. Alphas are the returns adjusted by four factors (i.e., MKT, SMB, HML, and UMD). Portfolio returns begin April 1984, using funds with at least 11 months of returns during the prior years. The sample includes the mutual-fund universe for the period April 1983 to December 2009. Other quintiles are in-between. The figure plots the four-factor alpha of the high-minus-low liquidity-beta fund decile return spread, where four factors are MKT, SMB, HML, and UMD, and the five-factor alpha, whether the additional factor is the traded liquidity risk factor alpha. The sample includes the mutual-fund universe for the period April 1983 to December 2009. 
